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Abstract
Background: In September 2003, the Canadian government committed to developing legislation that would
facilitate greater access to affordable medicines for developing countries. Over the course of eight months, the
legislation, now known as Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR), went through a controversial policy
development process and the newspaper media was one of the major venues in which the policy debates took
place. The purpose of this study was to examine how the media framed CAMR to determine how policy goals
were conceptualized, which stakeholder interests controlled the public debate and how these variables related to
the public policy process.
Methods: We conducted a qualitative content analysis of newspaper coverage of the CAMR policy and
implementation process from 2003-2008. The primary theoretical framework for this study was framing theory.
A total of 90 articles from 11 Canadian newspapers were selected for inclusion in our analysis. A team of four
researchers coded the articles for themes relating to access to medicines and which stakeholders’ voice figured
more prominently on each issue. Stakeholders examined included: the research-based industry, the generic
industry, civil society, the Canadian government, and developing country representatives.
Results: The most frequently mentioned themes across all documents were the issues of drug affordability,
intellectual property, trade agreements and obligations, and development. Issues such as human rights,
pharmaceutical innovation, and economic competitiveness got little media representation. Civil society dominated
the media contents, followed far behind by the Canadian government, the research-based and generic
pharmaceutical industries. Developing country representatives were hardly represented in the media.
Conclusions: Media framing obscured the discussion of some of the underlying policy goals in this case and failed
to highlight issues which are now significant barriers to the use of the legislation. Using the media to engage the
public in more in-depth exploration of the policy issues at stake may contribute to a more informed policy
development process. The media can be an effective channel for those stakeholders with a weaker voice in policy
deliberations to raise public attention to particular issues; however, the political and institutional context must be
taken into account as it may outweigh media framing effects.
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In September 2003, the Canadian government com-
mitted to developing legislation that would facilitate
greater access to affordable medicines for developing
countries. Over the course of eight months, the legisla-
tion, now known as Canada’s Access to Medicines
Regime (CAMR), went through a controversial policy
development process that involved a variety of stake-
holders with different interests and policy objectives.
CAMR policy debate triggered a wave of scholarship
from policy, legal, and public health perspectives; how-
ever, little attention has been given to the role of the
media throughout its policy development and imple-
mentation even though it was one of the major venues
through which this policy debate unfolded. The purpose
of this study was to examine how the media framed
CAMR to determine: 1) how policy goals were concep-
tualized; 2) which goals were predominantly voiced; 3)
which goals were silenced, and 4) which stakeholder
group controlled the public debate. Results will be dis-
cussed in relation to CAMR’s policy development pro-
cess to infer the potential effect of framing in the media
on policy formation and the final policy product. This
study is a precursor to future work that will examine
how the framing of policy goals relates to the agenda-
setting processes within the development and imple-
mentation of CAMR.
Global Drug Access and Policy Trade-Offs
The global inequity in access to medicines has received
significant international attention over the last decade.
Approximately one third of the world’s population still
lacks regular access to life-saving medicines[1]. Like
most health system problems, the issue of drug access is
complex and multi-faceted. The factors that prevent
populations from accessing life-saving drugs often reflect
the state of their health care systems: lack of infrastruc-
ture, human resources, financing and corruption are
only some of the causes[1]. However, one issue that has
received considerable attention has been the impact of
patent protection on drug access.
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Trade-
related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agree-
ment (TRIPS) requires all WTO Member countries to
implement minimum standards for the protection of
intellectual property. The exclusive marketing rights
obtained through intellectual property protection can
restrict market competition and result in high drug
prices[1]. The Doha Declaration, signed by the WTO
Ministerial Council in November 2001, reaffirmed coun-
tries’ rights to use the TRIPS safeguards to protect pub-
l i ch e a l t ha n di n2 0 0 3 ,t h eW o r l dT r a d eO r g a n i z a t i o n
waived Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement[2]. Conse-
quently, countries with pharmaceutical manufacturing
capacity were permitted to enact domestic legislation
allowing the production and export of generic versions
of patented drugs under compulsory licence to countries
with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity (the
“Paragraph 6 Decision”).
Canada immediately responded to this decision in
September 2003 and was the first country to announce
that it would implement the agreement to facilitate
greater access to affordable medicines for developing
countries. After a lengthy legislative process, Bill C-9,
now known as Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime
(CAMR), was passed in May 2004. Since then, CAMR
has been heavily criticized by many as being too com-
plex and burdensome to use for both generic companies
and importing developing countries[3]. Indeed, results
to date suggest show minimal impact: only one ship-
ment of drugs has been produced and exported since its
inception, with no sign of future shipments[3].
The newspaper media was one of the major mediums
through which the policy debate unfolded. Civil society’s
call to the Canadian government to implement the
WTO Paragraph 6 Decision [4], the Government’s
announcement of its intention to pass legislation [5] and
the research-based industry’s critical response [6] were
among the many news reports that captured front page
headlines in the major national print media. The legisla-
tion had a high priority with the outgoing and incoming
Liberal Prime Ministers, the latter whom referred to it
in his Speech to the Throne [7] and his address to the
World Economic Forum [8]. Furthermore, civil society
acknowledged their strategic use of the media to push
their policy points[9]. Given the potential influence of
the media on public opinion and on political elites’ pol-
icy considerations [10], what is said in media and by
who has implications on public policy.
Media as a Framer of Policy
How problems are understood is dependent upon the
language used to describe it. The concept of framing
describes that process of taking a complex situation and
emphasizing certain aspects over others[11]. By setting
the terms of the debate, framing determines what argu-
ments and facts are relevant and compelling. Further-
more, the development of strategic messages through
framing can make “what is wrong and what needs fix-
ing” [11] seem incredibly obvious.
The media’s issue-framing holds the potential of influ-
encing public perceptions of policy issues at large[12].
Used as a political tool the media may be driven by elite
stakeholders to construct and control the dissemination
of messages that serve a particular interest. Conversely,
t h em e d i am a ya l s ob eu n d e r s t o o da sav e h i c l ef o rl e s s
powerful stakeholders to expand a scope of conflict and
voice positions of contestation[13]. Ultimately, the fram-
ing and extent of coverage of a stakeholder’s interests
may be deemed a success if their frame becomes the
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ences policy making decisions.
This research questions how CAMR was framed dur-
ing its five year inception, how policy goals were con-
ceptualized, which goals were silenced and as a result,
which stakeholder interests predominated the debate.
Our research questions can only address the representa-
tion of issues through the analysis of media messages;
therefore, we can only infer the potential or intended
effects of newspaper coverage on the public, and there-
fore its potential role in the policy process.
This study involved a directed qualitative content ana-
lysis of newspaper coverage of the CAMR policy process
during its first five years from 2003-2008. Framing the-
ory guides our study with the goal of informing future
work that determines how the framing of identified pol-
icy trade-offs link to the policy and decision making
processes throughout the development and implementa-
tion of CAMR.
Methods
Data Collection
T h ee x c l u s i v ef o c u so ft h i ss t u d yw a sp r i n tn e w s p a p e r
media as print newspapers remain a traditional source
of news information in Canada. In 2007 three quarters
of Canadians over 18+ read a printed edition of a daily
newspaper on a weekly basis. Despite an emerging read-
ership of online readers in the past several years, only
3% of newspaper readers read only online editions[14].
The average daily circulation of print newspapers in
2007 stood at 4,674,900[14].
A purposeful criterion sampling technique was used to
identify and select regional newspapers and the two
national Canadian newspapers, with the largest circulation
rate[15]. Purposeful criterion sampling is the strategic
selection of information rich cases based on the purpose
and resources of a study. Given the national scope of the
topic the study team believed sampling a mix of the most
popular regional and national newspapers would conveni-
e n t l yf u l f i lt h es t u d yi n t e n t .T h eP r o Q u e s tN e w s p a p e r
database was used to identify newspapers which met the
above criteria and a search of the newspapers websites was
conducted to verify the circulation reporting. A total of
eleven newspapers fit the criteria and were selected. These
are listed in Table 1. The selection period for article sam-
pling was August 2003-June 2008. This time period repre-
sented the inception of the of the proposed Bill C-9
legislation to its present use.
Articles were selected according to their inclusion of
one or more of the following search terms. These terms
capture and represent core elements of the global medi-
cine access debate and the framing of Canada’s Access
to Medicines Regime: access to medicine(s); medicine(s);
access to essential medicine(s); access to drug(s); drug
access, access to pharmaceuticals; pharmaceutical access;
access to essential pharmaceuticals; Bill C-9, Canadian
Access to Medicines Regime, CAMR and Jean Chrétien
Pledge to Africa. This sample was augmented with arti-
cles that were already acquired by the research group as
part of a larger study but were not captured within our
search. Given the potential for duplication, the articles
were screen to avoid double reporting. A total of 90
unique articles were identified and selected for inclusion
in our analysis.
Data Analysis
A directed qualitative content analysis technique was
used to identify and analyze themes in the data[16,17].
The technique uses existing theory and literature to
inform the coding scheme while permitting new con-
cepts that appear in the data to be incorporated within
the existing framework. To permit a more explicit view
of the patterns that led to our associations and conclu-
sions, we counted the number of passages coded in the
categories[18]. The content and meaning of these cate-
gories were then examined and analyzed.
The concepts that informed the analytical coding
scheme were informed by the doctoral thesis research of
one of the authors (LE), which investigates a similar
topic. A team of four researchers with combined exper-
tise in drug policy and law further developed the coding
scheme and analyzed the data. To ensure the validity
and reliability of the coding scheme and procedure, [17]
eight articles were pulled at three different time points
and distributed across the four researchers. All articles
were coded separately and then the researchers met to
compare results. Each article was reviewed against the
codebook, discrepancies were discussed and consensus
was gathered to revise, add or remove themes, and clar-
ify existing codebook themes. This procedure was
repeated three times at which point there was full agree-
ment on the codebook and its definitions.
The codebook captured the themes and concepts
including but not exhaustive: intellectual property; trade
Table 1 Canadian Newspapers Searched
Rank Newspaper Weekly Circulation
1 Toronto Star 3,260,621
2 The Globe and Mail 2,024,320
4 La Presse (Montreal) 1,524,582
6 National Post 1,236,020
7 Vancouver Sun 1,030,691
8 The Gazette (Montreal) 974,021
9 Ottawa Citizen 919,931
10 Winnipeg Free Press 885,986
12 Edmonton Journal 873,754
15 The Chronicle-Herald (Halifax) 736,371
19 The Times-Colonist (Victoria) 502,675
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safety and regulatory approval; innovation; market com-
petition; industry profits; aid; development; domestic
economy; corruption and transparency; and CAMR-speci-
f i ct h e m e s .T h ea r t i c l e sw e r ed i v i d e da m o n g s tt h ef o u r
researchers who conducted all the coding. Codes were
entered into NVivo 8 to facilitate analysis and summari-
zation of the contents of the themes. NVivo is a qualita-
tive data analysis software package that facilitates the
organization and analysis of non-numerical or text-based
data[19].
Individual themes were re-analyzed for which stake-
holders’‘ voice’ figured more prominently on the issue.
We defined the actor’s voice as whenever an actor is
quoted or paraphrased. Stakeholders examined included:
the research-based industry, the generic industry, civil
society organizations and prominent individuals, the
Canadian government, other governments and interna-
tional governmental organizations.
Results
The Story
Media coverage on Canada’s implementation of the
Paragraph 6 Decision started on September 23, 2003
with reporting of Stephen Lewis’ call to G7 nations to
step up and amend their patent laws to facilitate the
production and export of drugs to developing countries.
He urged Canada in particular given its generic industry
and the Liberal government’s foreign policy commit-
ment to fighting HIV/AIDS.
“Canadian Stephen Lewis...said in an interview that a
G7 nation must step forward immediately with a
patent initiative to break the logjam preventing the
m a s sp r o d u c t i o na n de x p o r to fu pt o$ 1 - b i l l i o n( U . S . )
a year of life-saving drugs, mostly for Africa” [4].
Shortly after, the Liberal government announced that
it would soon introduce legislation to facilitate the
WTO Decision. Cabinet Ministers and government offi-
cials were quoted with much self-congratulatory praise,
speaking of setting a precedent, blazing the trail and
encouraging other countries to follow suit.
“Prime Minister Jean Chrétien said Canada is making
history by following through on a World Trade Orga-
nization initiative to allow patent laws to be changed
so that low-cost generic versions of brand-name drugs
could be shipped to developing countries” [20].
The legislation generated a flood of praise for the
Canadian government from all over the world, hailing
Canada as an international leader. The legislation was
greeted with high hopes, framed “a major breakthrough
in the international community’s capacity to provide
treatment and access to medicines” [21].
“Bono singing Chrétien’sp r a i s e s ;‘Your leadership on
Africa will be a legacy’, Liberals’ efforts to pave the way
for the sale of cheap, generic-produced drugs to Africa.
‘Canada way out ahead in pioneering solutions so despe-
rately needed by the poorest and most vulnerable,’ Bono
wrote” [22].
Initially, the research-based industry did not join the
chorus of praise, stating that the legislation would not
solve a thing, hurt domestic investment and would
erode patent protection. This discourse quickly sub-
sided, however, with the industry quickly issuing its sup-
port for the legislation.
“Canada’s Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies,
al o b b yg r o u pf o rt h eb r a n d - n a m ef i r m s ,s a i di na
press release that it recognizes Canada ‘has an oppor-
tunity to show international leadership’ by changing
patent laws to improve access to drugs” [23].
Soon after the flood of enthusiasm, the tone of the
media quickly changed having received word that the
draft legislation might be problematic. Activists and the
civil society community were quoted in the media as
describing the legislation as “fatally flawed,”[24] poten-
tially undermining the law and threatening Canada’s
chance at showing global leadership. Suggestions that
the government might embarrass itself if it passes a
flawed bill and would “betray those people in poor
countries it purports to assist” [25].
“The new Prime Minister, Paul Martin, faces a choice:
Will Canada take a strong global leadership role for
the greater good of humanity or will Canada fold
under the pressure of corporate pharmaceutical giants
and place their profits ahead of public health?” [26]
This discourse dominated the papers from late 2003,
through the parliamentary committee hearings, until it
w a sp a s s e do nM a y1 4 ,2 0 0 4 .A tt h a tp o i n t ,t h el e g i s l a -
tion received mainly negative coverage. It was tagged as
being “needlessly complicated” [27], discourages generic
company participation, and was more burdensome than
the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision.
“Canadian triumph turns sour: We thought we were
setting an example for the world. Now we can only
hope the world doesn’t look too closely” [28].
The Liberal government, however, had more positive
comments regarding the legislation with Liberal MP
Brent St. Denis, who headed the Parliamentary commit-
tee, calling it a good model for the world.
The 2006 AIDS Conference held in Toronto marked
another spike in media coverage. Much of the coverage
was negative in tone, highlighting the fact that no
exports had yet to be achieved by the legislation, calling
for the government to review it, amend it, and also take
the issue back to the WTO level.
“‘We have failed lamentably,’ said Lewis. ‘It’sa l m o s t
unbelievable that two governments - one Liberal and
one Conservative - can’t get a single pill to Africa.’”
[29].
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its intention to review the legislative initiative and
initiated the consultation process in November 2006.
The Issues: How did the media frame drug access in the
case of CAMR?
Table 2 presents the frequency with which the media
discussed the major policy goals. The most frequently
mentioned themes across all documents were the issues
of affordability (212 paragraphs), intellectual property
(198 paragraphs), trade agreements and obligations (111
paragraphs), and development (96 paragraphs). The con-
tents of the major themes are summarized below with
an explanation of which actors’ voices were predomi-
nant (Additional File 1). Figure 1 provides an overview
of the major policy goals and positions for each stake-
holder group as portrayed by the media.
Affordability
Government and civil society voices were most fre-
quently observed on this topic. Government declared its
commitment to making affordable drugs available to
poor countries, with reports initially suggesting that the
impact of Canada’s legislative initiative could save mil-
lions of lives. The Foreign Affairs Minister wrote an opi-
nion piece immediately prior to the legislation’s
announcement, linking the issue of affordability with
government intervention.
“With these lives at stake, governments should
responsibly intervene to ensure that medicines are avail-
able to those unable to pay market price” [21].
After the legislation was passed, voices representing
government were heard less in regard to Canada’s
potential to contribute, saying that if the legislation sim-
ply encourages other countries to make more cheap
drugs then it was fulfilling its goal.
Civil society voices were reported as emphasizing the
“desperate need” for affordable medicines in the devel-
oping world, arguing that the AIDS pandemic requires a
“massive inflow of affordable anti-retroviral drugs” [30].
They viewed CAMR as part of the solution.
“Canada could do much, much more to respond to
the desperate need for affordable medicines in many
developing countries. Most of these people died prema-
turely because they could not afford to buy their lives –
because medicines accepted as standard in wealthy
countries are simply too expensive. Had the drugs been
more affordable, many of these deaths could have been
prevented” [31].
Viewed as one more source of generic AIDS drugs,
civil society also viewed CAMR as key to generating
market competition thereby decreasing global prices.
Stephen Lewis’ voice figured prominently on this topic,
as with most themes emphasized by civil society. The
media reported Lewis’ call to the government to amend
its patent law and implement the August 30, 2003
WTO Decision to allow a sustainable supply of afford-
able medicines, given the prospect of existing generic
drugs sources in India drying up.
“India is now supplying low-cost drugs, off patent.
But this is for a limited period of time, then they will
have to comply with international trade laws. India
also has a growing problem with AIDS, and its drugs
will be needed increasingly within the country. What
Canada is doing gives hope that the supply will be sus-
tained” [32].
The research-based industry was quoted infrequently
on affordability, linking the legislation to the threat of
diversion of these medicines back into profitable, devel-
oped country markets. They also suggested that the
issue had already been addressed, with India already
supplying the developing world with AIDS medicines
along with their own voluntary price reductions. The
Gates Foundation echoed the industry’sv i e wt h a td r u g
affordability is no longer an issue.
“Melinda Gates...said yesterday getting drug companies
to lower their prices so more drugs can make it out to
impoverished African nations isn’t really an issue any
more. ‘The issue now is how we retain enough person-
nel in these countries to help administer and deliver the
drugs on an ongoing basis,’ she told reporters. ‘And that
cost is still very high.’” [29].
The generic industry was the least vocal on this topic,
referring mainly to the low cost of their drugs and their
ability to compete globally. After the legislation was in
effect, they mentioned the disinterest of Canadian gen-
eric companies in producing low cost drugs under the
legislation, arguing as the brand industry did that the
need was already being filled by suppliers from India.
Table 2 Frequency of Discussion of Major Policy Goals
1
Aid 43
Corruption and Transparency 21
Development 96
Affordability 212
Profits 37
Market Competition 32
Domestic economy 13
Human Rights 3
Innovation 14
Production Costs 7
Procurement Practices 8
Quality, safety, regulatory approval 50
Litigation 27
Developing Country Pressure 9
Trade Agreements and Obligations 111
Intellectual Property 198
1Frequency counts indicate number of paragraphs where the policy goal was
discussed.
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Civil society’s voice was most dominant on the issue of
intellectual property (IP) and patents. They predomi-
nantly framed IP in terms of trade and as a threat to
public health. Emphasis was placed on the restrictions
patent laws create to making drugs accessible to devel-
oping countries, arguing that the “doors to generic drug
production and export are closing fast” [32].
Lewis appeared to echo Médecins Sans Frontières’
(MSF) rhetoric that patents were a “matter of life and
death” [33] and framed the Canadian government as
holding Africa to a lower standard, given its move in
2001 to waive patent law to produce low-cost drugs for
Canadian during the Anthrax scare. He framed CAMR
as a quotient of hope for eliminating IP-related barriers
to drug access.
“Canada’s Stephen Lewis, the United Nations envoy
for HIV/AIDS in Africa, calls this ‘the largest quotient
of hope we’ve had in a long, long time.’ Certainly, some-
thing had to be done. Of the 6 million who need AIDS
drugs in the poor countries, barely 300,000 get them.
The WTO decision came none too soon” [34].
The Liberal Government was also frequently observed
on the issue of IP, framing it as innovation and knowl-
edge, as providing incentives and funding for future
R&D and for ensuring the development of new medi-
cines for the future. One op-ed article prior to the gov-
ernment’s announcement by Foreign Affairs Minister,
Bill Graham, implied that in this particular case, drug
affordability took precedence over patents.
“There are legitimate concerns that our access-to-
medicines initiative might interfere with the capacity of
pharmaceutical companies to fund the research and
development that will produce new medicines of the
future. We all benefit when intellectual property rights
provide incentives for innovation. But the problem is
that sick people in poor countries cannot wait until new
medicines are affordable” [21].
However, government clearly said that they still valued
intellectual property protection, linking it to Canada’s
domestic economy.
“We will continue to protect intellectual property
because we believe, and [Liberal leadership front-runner]
Figure 1 Main Stakeholder Policy Goals and Positions as Portrayed by the Media.
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edge is the future of Canada’s economic success” [5].
There was a clear challenge for the Canadian govern-
ment to enact legislation that catered to the health
emergencies of poor countries while protecting intellec-
tual property for the success of Canada’s domestic econ-
omy. Ideas of crafting a precise “surgical strike” to
patent laws were iterated[6]. The government’s balance
was framed as one between affordability and intellectual
property rights, as well as international development
and intellectual property rights.
“Senior government officials say they’re determined to
craft a precise, ‘surgical strike’ change to the act that
would allow generic drug-makers to manufacture for
export certain medicines still under patent, but which
has no other impact on patent rules” [6].
But another senior official in another department said
Ottawa is still not prepared to deny brand-name drug
companies the right to supply medicines ahead of gen-
eric companies that would simply be copying their intel-
lectual property[24].
The research-based industry limited their remarks on
IP but was clear on their position. Initially, as seen earlier,
the brand industry reacted with scathing remarks with
the Director-General of the IFPMA, Harvey Bale, linking
the Canadian initiative to the erosion of intellectual prop-
erty rights, which would negatively impact domestic R&D
investment. Bale also accused the Canadian generic
industry of ulterior motives to erode patent protection.
“He cautioned that the changes contemplated in
Canada will erode patent protection and scare off future
research spending by biotech investors leery of changes
to intellectual property right guarantees” [6].
After these initial statements, the tone of the brand
industry’s comments changed immediately, citing sup-
port for the legislation and saying that Canada “has an
opportunity to show international leadership” [23] by
changing patent laws to improve access to the drugs.
The industry’s position on IP was further evidenced
through a letter to the editor suggesting that patents are
not the barrier to drug access, citing that 95% of drugs
listed on the WHO’s Essential Medicines List are not
protected by patents.
“Intellectual property protection is not a barrier but a
facilitator to access. If intellectual property rights are
not respected, new medicines may not be developed to
provide better treatments and cures for diseases that
impact the most vulnerable” [35].
The generic industry had virtually no comments aside
from their reference to the industry’s litigious nature in
relation to patent infringement.
Trade Agreements and Obligations
Civil society was, again, the most noticeable voice in this
c a t e g o r y .T h ek e ym e s s a g e sv o i c e db yN G O s
transformed over the life of the legislation; however, the
framing remained consistent. In the early stages, most
of civil society discourse reiterated calls to government
to implement the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision saying
that the agreement “...removes any shred of an excuse
that Canada’s hands are tied by our international obliga-
tions” [31]. Acknowledging that the WTO Decision was
complicated on its own, they argued that if ‘robustly
implemented with a minimum of interference’, the legis-
lation would be worthwhile.
“Rather than creating unnecessary, additional privileges
for brand-name companies, why doesn’tt h eg o v e r n m e n t
just proceed with a straightforward and faithful imple-
mentation of the WTO decision from last fall?” [25].
During the time when amendments to the legislation
were being proposed, civil society framed the rules
embedded within the legislation as counter-productive,
restrictive and an invitation to abusive litigation by
patent-holders. Above all, they framed the Canadian leg-
islation as going above and beyond what was required
by the WTO Decision.
After the legislation was passed, NGOs continued to
emphasize the threat of trade and intellectual property
laws and the failures of the legislation. Particularly, the
flaws in the Canadian legislations process, including its
complexity, inefficiency and extra requirements, were at
the forefront of reporting. The flaws in the system were
commonly referenced back to the original WTO
framework.
“At the bare minimum, said Elliott, Canada needs to
get rid of the extra requirements it added. But that, he
warns, would be ‘sort of like tinkering around the edges’
and not addressing the real problem which is the origi-
nal Aug. 30, 2003 decision by the WTO to allow copies
of patented drugs” [29].
Government’s voice was less pronounced but still pre-
sent on this issue. Canadian government officials were
vocal in expressing a sense of urgency for leading a
change in implementing the WTO agreement to combat
pandemics such as AIDS, malaria and TB experienced
in developing countries. They were hopeful that they
would be a leading example and noted the possibility
that their legislation could become the model.
“Canada will be the first country to introduce legisla-
tion to implement the WTO agreement. We hope that
our quick response will encourage other countries to
follow our example,” [20].
The remainder of the discourse in this section framed
the design of their legislation in relation to the obliga-
tions and requirements of the WTO agreement. The
complexity and ambiguities of the WTO agreement was
also expressed, showing the Canadian government’s
trepidation.
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first step,’ one official said on condition of anonymity.
‘We’re not ready with all of the details. It’sac o m p l e x
scheme of royalties and applying for diseases. We’re
going into unknown territories, so to speak.’” [20].
The research based pharmaceutical industry’sf e w
comments framed the WTO Decision’s implementation
in relation to keeping futurei n n o v a t i o na n dt h ed e v e l -
opment needs of developing countries in mind.
“The brand-name industry ‘is working with the federal
government to determine how the WTO decision can
best be implemented, taking into account the current
and future needs of developing countries, of Canada
and of patients worldwide,’ Mr. Elston said in the state-
ment” [23].
The generic industry’s comments were most apparent
well after the legislation had passed, without effect. It
blamed the complexity of the WTO agreement and also
of CAMR for taking on requirements beyond what the
WTO required.
“He blamed the [WTO] agreement’s bureaucratic
complexity. ‘I remember the Indian generic association
a tt h et i m es a y i n g ,‘we don’t think this is ever going to
be used.’ So far, they’ve been right.’” [36].
Development
Upon announcement of the legislation, Canada was
hailed as a leader in international development, receiv-
ing wide praise from around the world by figures
including UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the World
Health Organization, UNICEF, Stephen Lewis, the UN’s
special envoy on HIV/AIDS in Africa, and rock star and
international development advocate, Bono.
“I do believe we’re at a moment when Canada’sp r o -
ven commitment and reputation can profoundly affect
how we think about these issues and what is possible to
achieve” [37].
Reports emphasized both the impact of HIV/AIDS on
development as well as the need to address development
issues to combat the pandemic, including a need for
increased resources to develop the health care infra-
structure and address treatment, care and prevention.
Overall, a clear association was being made between
development and health improvement, although its
directionality shifted depending upon the messenger.
The dominant voice in this category was civil society
and, in particular Stephen Lewis and MSF. Their focus
was on the terrible toll of HIV/AIDS on individuals and
communities, which was framed in terms of emergency
and human tragedy, as well as the fact that development
in Africa is paralysed by the epidemic. They also empha-
sized the existing global drug inequity and the need for
developed countries to support Africa by making drugs
available.
“In turn, economies are reeling; having already lost
about 20 years off average life expectancies, countries
severely affected by HIV/AIDS will lose at least 20 per
cent of their GDP by 2020. As sick workers become
unable to work land, and the uninfected focus on caring
for sick and orphaned children, traditional agriculture is
collapsing in many parts of southern Africa. Commerce
is suffering as companies incur losses in the form of
higher disability pensions, funeral benefits, and turnover
and training costs” [21].
The government, which was less vocal, framed CAMR
largely as a tool to help address the HIV/AIDS pan-
demic and therefore address development, with the
Prime Minister and Minister of International Trade par-
ticularly supportive of the initiative. The Liberal govern-
ment’s initiatives and financial commitments to HIV/
AIDS programming and social development initiatives
were mentioned. One MP from the Conservative oppo-
sition party joined the voices in condemning the human
tragedy of HIV/AIDS, citing his party’s support for the
legislation.
“‘It is a priority for us to implement the WTO agree-
ment that will ensure that poor countries have access to
medicine to combat pandemics such as AIDS, malaria
and tuberculosis,’ Mr. Pettigrew said in an interview in
Toronto” [33].
In contrast, the research-based industry framed devel-
opment as part of the problem of drug access and in
that sense development should be first addressed
through improved health care infrastructure, training
and delivery. They stated their position with scathing
remarks upon announcement of the legislation, arguing
that access to cheaper generic drugs should be at the
“bottom of the totem pole” [6] of solutions and that
cash should be funnelled into the infrastructure of
developing countries and to the Global Fund.
“Mr. Bale questioned whether the Liberal government,
even if it did introduce legislative changes, would be
doing much to really help Africa. ‘[Stephen] Lewis is
leading us all down the primrose path to a dead end,’
Mr. Bale contended, saying more money for medical
infrastructure in Africa, rather than yet another interna-
tional supplier of cheap drugs, is what’sn e e d e dt of i g h t
AIDS and other health crises” [6].
As stated earlier, Melinda Gates supported this
position.
Only two passages were identified from global institu-
tions, the WTO Director General is reported to have
supported the right of poor countries to make full use
of TRIPS flexibilities to counter diseases, while a
research-based industry op-ed piece quoted the WHO
Director General as saying that better health infrastruc-
ture and clean water are essential to effectiveness of
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this issue.
Hardly mentioned were calls to develop manufactur-
ing capacity in the developing world and inadequate
institutional capacity to implement the WTO provisions,
the latter noted by a Tanzanian government official dur-
ing the 2006 AIDS Conference.
“Tanzania is not in a position to fulfill all require-
ments needed before importing drugs. The country is
now identifying changes to its laws necessary for it to
place orders with generic companies” [27].
Aid
Overall, reports recognize that developing countries
need more international assistance to fight the AIDS
pandemic. The cooperation of international organiza-
tions, NGOs and developed countries on delivering this
assistance beyond the distribution of drugs was noted.
The media coverage of the voices of civil society, the
research-based industry and government were approxi-
mately equal.
Stephen Lewis, in his capacity as UN Special Envoy,
spoke of the massive inflow of aid and antiretroviral
drugs required in sub-Saharan Africa. He framed this
issue in terms of the West’s moral deficit, criticized
Canada specifically for lagging in its aid commitments
and framed CAMR as a way to restore some of Canada’s
moral authority.
“‘And,’ Lewis said, ‘this will help to restore Canada’s
position in international aid, and its moral authority.
(Among the developed countries), Canada’s contribution
to aid has dropped from sixth to 16th place. That
means there’s too big a gap between rhetoric and
action.’” [32].
The generic industry is reported as supporting CAMR,
framing it as an aid initiative, but having a problem with
its provisions for litigation.
“It’sl i k es a y i n g ,‘please come down and donate to the
food bank, but you better be careful because you might
end up getting sued’, said Mr. Keon” [36].
The Liberal Government is reported as being enthu-
siastically supportive of initiative to make cheap drugs
more available. Paul Martin reported to go further than
that and urged other G7 countries to donate to the Glo-
bal Fund, assist developing countries to win approval
from WTO to import cheap drugs and to exploit
CIDA’s capacity.
“He [Paul Martin] urged the federal government to go
even further yesterday, suggesting that Canada lobby
other Group of Seven countries to join in, increase its
funding to the Global Fund to fight AIDS, help develop-
ing countries win approval from the World Trade Orga-
nization to import cheap drugs, and use the Canadian
International Development Agency to distribute the
drugs to poor countries” [38].
The research-based industry indicated full support of
the initiative, citing the need to improve access to medi-
cines and health care systems. In an opinion piece, the
industry recognizes the human toll caused by HIV/AIDS.
They establish that its commitment to this cause predates
CAMR, by enumerating its monetary donations, partner-
ships with NGOs, and capacity building in Africa.
“First of all, we recognize the untold suffering caused
by HIV/AIDS and the threat it poses in the developing
world. That is why research-based pharmaceutical com-
panies globally are currently working in partnership
with more than 25 international aid programs including
United Nations agencies, the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation and many others. Since 2000 alone, we have
provided billions of dollars in aid and enough health
interventions for 539 million people or more than two
thirds of the population of sub- Saharan Africa” [39].
Market Competition
Civil society was by far the loudest voice on this issue
(in terms of strength of language, and level of coverage),
arguing generally that the role of CAMR is to increase
generic competition in the market for antiretroviral
drugs. There was significant criticism of the research-
based industry and the use of the terms “monopoly” and
“monopolistic” appeared several times. Initial reports
suggest that some African activists viewed CAMR as
capable of producing a significant effect on drug prices.
“‘F o ru s ,t h i si sa nh i s t o r i co c c a s i o n , ’ TAC chairman
Zackie Achmat said. ‘It’s come late. It’sc o m ea tac o s t
of many thousands of lives, but we now want to say to
the drug companies, ‘Let’s put this behind us, and move
on.’’ Mr. Achmat, who is HIV-positive, now pays $74
per month for drugs (in a country where the average
monthly income is $305), but the new competition
could drive the price as low as $18 per month” [40].
The Liberal government’s few comments supported this
role, regardless of whether it leads to shipments, on the
basis that “it offers an alternative drug supplier when poor
countries negotiate with patented-drug makers” [41].
Civil society also criticized CAMR as giving the
research-based industry the chance to block the generic
competition required to bring medicines prices down
under the so-called “right of refusal” clause. As such, it
was a self-defeating piece of legislation. This particular
provision was referred to as competitive and efficient, by
the research-based industry.
“‘We believe the importing countries should have
options as to who can supply at the best possible price
in the most timely fashion,’ Jacques Lefebvre said” [42].
The remaining comments made by other stakeholders
spoke of market competition under different terms.
Research-based companies argued that the market “has
no room for Canadian companies, since generic drugs
from India and Brazil will undercut their rock-bottom
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idea, acknowledging the possibility that they may not be
able to compete globally on price but would lead on
quality setting a standard for the global ARV market.
Developing Country Pressure
Civil society was the only voice that described the pres-
sure that developing countries face in using the flexibil-
ities in intellectual property law in trying to improve
access to medicines. They described “attempts by
wealthy countries” to “weaken proposals from develop-
ing countries...acting in the interests of the multinational
pharmaceutical companies” during earlier rounds of
WTO negotiations[31]. They argued that the WTO
Paragraph 6 Decision still offers opportunities for gov-
ernments to challenge countries in their attempts to use
the procedure.
“MSF has argued, as well, that countries are reluctant
to declare their intent to take advantage of the compul-
sory licence provisions because of fear of pressure from
brand-name pharmaceutical companies and the United
States” [27].
The Tanzanian High Commissioner was quoted in
relation to this pressure as well.
“‘One wouldn’t expect pharmaceutical companies to
be very keen about this, and we know that some coun-
tries try to protect their own domestic industry,’ says
Sefue. ‘One can’t be oblivious to the fact that there
might be political pressure for countries not to follow
that route – that is a reality of the world.’” [27].
Quality, Safety and Regulatory Approval
The generic industry’s voice was prominent on the issue
of drug quality and regulatory approval both before and
after the legislation was passed. Early statements sug-
gested that the Canadian generic industry’sr o l ew a s
really to set a standard for the quality of generics AIDS
drugs. During CAMR’s implementation, Apotex referred
to a lengthy drug development and drug approval
process.
“Manufacturers will probably need 18 to 24 months
to apply for approvals from Health Canada, find raw
materials and set up production lines, said Jack Kay,
president of Toronto-based Apotex Inc., one of Cana-
da’s largest generic-drug companies. And that’so n l yi f
government regulators agree to fast-track their
approval systems, he said, adding that the scope of the
legislation is still up for debate and it’s difficult to tell
now how co-operative Canadian drug regulators will
be” [43].
Civil Society was also a prominent voice but its
major complaint was that Health Canada approval was
not required by the WTO Decision and that it added
an extra 6 months to the drug order. MSF argued that
developing countries rely on drug approvals from the
World Health Organization and that the Health
Canada approval was superfluous and simply delayed
things.
From the research-based industry, many statements
came from Bayer Inc., which argued that safety was the
main issue they requested to have moxifloxacillin taken
off the list of eligible of medicines.
“We want to ensure that our products are used safely
and appropriately in accordance with Health Canada’s
approved indications. When it comes to pharmaceutical
therapies, surely patients in developing countries should
not be subject to a lower standard of care than Cana-
dians” [44].
The government’s voice only issued a promise to fast-
track its review of any products submitted for approval
under the new law.
Corruption, Diversion and Transparency
Some reports in the media generated concern over the
diversion of medicines produced under CAMR back
into developed country markets. Reports referred to the
WTO requirements to prevent diversion, the potential
for litigation if diversion occurred, and the implications
of diversion.
“...generic knockoffs of AIDS drugs will ‘leak’ from the
poor countries to other countries. Leaks can turn into
f l o o d sa n dt h ec h e a pd r u g sc o u l ds h o wu pi nr i c h e r
countries where they would compete illegally with their
brand-name versions. If that were to happen, the profits
required to fund drug research and development pro-
grams could be threatened” [45].
Research-based industry voices were the most promi-
nent, with one report concerned that the diversion of
g e n e r i cv e r s i o n so ft h e i rm e d i c i n e sw o u l d“undercut”
the research-based industry’s drugs sold in developed
countries, “rendering patents worthless” [23]. Industry
concerns appear to be focused on the detrimental effect
these actions would have on the market value of medi-
cines in developed world markets. The markets of
Canada, the US and Europe are mentioned specifically.
The government was mainly silent on this issue but
appeared to be equally concerned, with one government
official paraphrased as saying:
“...in a worst-case scenario, drug manufacturers could
even stop supplying Canada with certain drugs to fight
AIDS and other health crises if the cheaper copies end
up being sold in large numbers on the black market
within Canada” [46].
The generic industry, on the other hand, was indicated
as concerned that they would lose their license if diver-
sion occurred. Civil society echoed their concerns.
One statement by an African NGO called for careful
monitoring of imports into African countries with “less
than transparent governments” [47].
“You have these cases where we get waivers [to import
generics or to pay lower prices for patented
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companies take the opportunity to make money. Minis-
tries of health are going to have to be careful” [47].
Domestic Economy
The research-based industry’s voice was the most domi-
nant but only reflected initial statements by Harvey Bale
saying that the introduction of this legislation would
“hurt Canada as a destination for international research
and development.”
“It will be a ‘negative black eye for Canada’ that will ‘very
well affect the investment climate,’ Mr. Bale said” [6].
I nr e s p o n s e ,t h eg o v e r n m e n t ,w h o s ev o i c ew a sm u c h
less present on this issue, tried to comfort these con-
cerns by reaffirming their commitment to protecting
intellectual property because “innovation and knowledge
is the future of Canada’s economic success” [5].
Civil society was notably absent on this issue aside
from a statement from Stephen Lewis which said that “a
patent initiative would not undermine the domestic
pharmaceutical industry” [4].
Other comments referred to the impact of HIV/AIDS
on the domestic economies of developing countries,
thereby threatening their political and social
development.
Industry Profits
Reports on the issue of profits appear to accept the idea
that corporate entities respond to incentives and will
n o ts u p p l yw h e r et h e r ei sn op r o f i t .T h e s er e p o r t sa l s o
seem to implicitly accept that the trade-off is between
profit and health. One article does note the lack of mar-
ket power in the countries that would benefit from
CAMR.
Many voices were engaged on this issue. Most com-
ments by civil society emphasized the need for financial
incentives to engage the generic industry’s participation
and their concern about the litigation if firms charged
prices higher than 25 per cent of the Canadian prices
charged by the patent holder.
“‘The scheme depends on generics using it – essentially
there has to be some economic incentive. Generics may
have humanitarian reasons as well, but this can’tj u s t
depend on goodwill. They are commercial enterprises,’
says Elliott. ‘For it to be economically worth their time
and effort, they need economies of scale.’” [27].
Other comments framed the research-based industry as
extremely profit-driven, expecting the industry to “fight
long and hard to protect their profitable patents” [48].
Comments from the research-based industry, empha-
sized that Canadian generic shipments need to be non-
profit or for humanitarian and non-commercial use
only, linking it to the threat of litigation. Other state-
ments spoke of the industry’s efforts to provide their
drugs at cost or below cost to parts of the developing
world.
The generic industry counterbalanced the industry’s
concerns about profit saying that no business case could
be made for exporting drugs at cost and that any
CAMR initiatives would not be commercially significant
for them. At most, they hoped “to gain profile, enhance
its reputation for quality and build goodwill” [43].
“‘It’s an uncertain, difficult, lengthy process for our
companies to basically sell below cost or donate pro-
ducts they don’t even make [yet],’ said Jeff Connell,
spokesman for the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical
Association. ‘It’su n c l e a rh o wi t ’s all going to work
out.’” [41].
During the drug order, Apotex spoke of its intention
to charge MSF for only the price of the raw materials,
while other reports claimed that MSF would pay 43
cents per pill for 150,000 pills, bringing in revenues of
$64,500.
The Liberal government spoke only to defend the
profit threshold of 25 per cent on the price, mainly on
the basis of affordability and to respect trade obligations:
“It keeps the fire to the feet of the generics” [49]. An
industry official noted that some money could be made
but that it did not accommodate lucrative transactions.
Litigation
The generic drug industry was the most vocal in this
category, arguing that CAMR’sp r o v i s i o n se x p o s et h e m
to many opportunities for litigation from the patent-
holders, which would ultimately discourage them from
participating in the initiative. They spoke of the litigious
nature of the research-based pharmaceutical industry
noting that they took Canadian generic companies to
court approximately 320 times over the past decade.
“Mr. Connell argued brand-name drug companies are
notoriously litigious, and cited as evidence their long
record of suing the government of South Africa for
infringing on drug patents. ‘They sued Nelson Man-
dela,’ he said. ‘They won’tt h i n kt w i c ea b o u tt a k i n g
our companies to court.’” [49].
Civil society supported these concerns, albeit at a
much more muted level, saying that the provisions ulti-
mately undermined the purpose of the legislation.
In contrast, research-based companies stated that they
were unlikely to take legal action, as long as the generic
companies maintained the non-profit nature of the
initiative. The representative of Canada’sR x & Dw a s
quoted as saying that the generic companies were just
making excuses for their unwillingness to participate in
the initiative.
“‘It seems the generics are spending a lot of energy on
reasons why they can’td ot h i s , ’ spokesman Jacques
Lefebvre said. ‘As for being worried about lawsuits ...
if you respect the regulations that are in place, you
shouldn’t worry about lawsuits.’” [41].
No statements from government were observed.
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The media repeated the theme of a need for balance to
be struck between the goal of innovation and the goal
of access. Commentators both side with the argument
of respecting patent rights, and also those who call for a
new way to conduct business.
Those calling for respecting patent rights argued that
the contrary would be the end of innovation. The brand
industry reflected this claim, by citing their support for
CAMR but emphasizing the importance of protecting
IP, which they framed hand-in-hand with innovation.
They emphasized the number of HIV/AIDS drugs and
vaccines they had under development and at one point,
suggested that the role of innovator might be more
important than ensuring affordable generic drugs are
available to the poor.
“Peter Bains, senior vice-president for Glaxo, noted that
the company had already dramatically lowered the prices
of its drugs (3TC, AZT and Combivir) and voluntarily
granted Aspen a licence in 2001. He called yesterday’s
agreement ‘an appropriate response to the HIV/AIDS
pandemic in the region.’‘ Perhaps more importantly, we
are leading efforts to discover and develop new vaccines
and medicines for AIDS,’ he told reporters” [40].
The government clearly showed its value for innova-
tion, through its economic importance as well as its
health benefits, despite their comments at the early
stages of the legislation that placed affordable drugs for
developing countries as a priority.
“In the face of these realities, we cannot afford to con-
duct business as usual in the realm of foreign affairs. And
frankly, we cannot afford to conduct business as usual in
the realm of business, either. There are legitimate con-
cerns that our access-to-medicines initiative might inter-
fere with the capacity of pharmaceutical companies to
fund the research and development that will produce
new medicines of the future. We all benefit when intel-
lectual property rights provide incentives for innovation.
But the problem is that sick people in poor countries
cannot wait until new medicines are affordable” [21].
Production Costs
Few reports were made about whether Canada’s generic
industry would be able to produce drugs cheaply
enough to win developing country contracts. In particu-
lar, concerns were raised late in the implementation
stages about their ability to compete with other manu-
facturers in the developing world, given the low costs of
production and raw materials.
The generic industry’s voice appears to be the loudest,
saying that the legislation makes it onerous and too
costly to produce drugs under the legislation. Apotex
stated that the price at which MSF had agreed to pay
them for the drug wouldn’t cover all of their research
and legal expenses.
“‘We’ve spent millions of dollars on the [research and
development], we’ve spent lawyers’ time at our cost, just
because it’s the right thing to do. It would be difficult to
do again unless the legislation is made simpler,’ Elie
Betito said” [50].
There is some attention paid to the two-year contract
limit and its effect on their viability for generics.
Human Rights
Human rights was hardly mentioned in the media. The
few statements that were made focused on the disparity
between developing and developed countries. At the
forefront of this discussion was Bill Graham in early
November 2003, framing CAMR as a tool to achieve
human rights and address the injustice.
“The current initiative sets a unique global standard
on the frontiers of public health and human rights. For
years there has been an injustice in the global response
to diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria:
while prevention has been emphasized worldwide, only
in developed countries have life-saving medicines been
widely available. The result has been the sickness and
deaths of millions, the devastation of communities,
economies, and in some places the reversal of decades’
worth of progress” [21].
Discussion
Results provide insights into three aspects of the policy
debate in the media: how stakeholders and the media
framed the debate, which stakeholder’s voice dominated
the media debate and what the potential effects of
media framing might be on the policy process and final
policy product. Quantitative results show the range and
emphasis of concepts that were raised by stakeholders.
In large part, these policy goals are the language
through which more fundamental policy disputes take
place. Affordability, intellectual property, trade agree-
ments and obligations, and development were the major
issues raised but stakeholders interpreted these policy
goals in very different ways.
Overall, the media conveyed different policy goals and
trade-offs at the various stages of the policy’sd e v e l o p -
ment and implementation. Initially, civil society called
on the government to amend its patent law to save lives
through production and export of cheap generic drugs
at the expense of limiting intellectual property rights.
The brand industry responded by framing CAMR as
achieving nothing while trading off domestic R&D
investment and eroding patent protection. Meanwhile,
the Canadian foreign minister explicitly stated its inten-
tion to address drug affordability in poor countries
despite the consequences such efforts have on intellec-
tual property rights. The industry eventually supported
the legislation; however, their emphasis on the need to
comply with the WTO Decision signalled a shift in the
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framed decisions that were unpopular with civil society
and the generic industry as necessary in complying with
WTO obligations. Civil society responded by framing
their policy positions in similar terms.
By restricting the scope of issues up for discussion in
debates, framing can hide the some of the assumptions
that underpin the trade-offs underlying policy debates.
The emphasis on intellectual property issues and trade
agreements and obligations may seem obvious because
CAMR is the implementation of the WTO Paragraph 6
Decision; however, these policy goals appeared to
become ends in themselves in the media debates. Fram-
ing effectively obscured the debate from the bigger soci-
etal questions such as the role of intellectual property
rights in drug innovation and affordability, the relation-
ship between trade agreements and the domestic econ-
omy and whether policies like CAMR are even desirable
in addressing the global drug inequity.
The topic of intellectual property law is a highly tech-
nical area, which makes it difficult to convey in real
human terms the relevance and impact of WTO clauses
under debate. In such contexts, simple rhetoric such as
“breaking patents harm innovation” or “patents = death”
holds appeal because it is comprehendible and believ-
able. Actors use these sound-bites to push their specific
policy points but these frames force stakeholders into
defending their corners and hinder the way to finding
common ground. In practice, the trade-offs in public
policy are rarely certain and full of nuance, which does
not find its way into a media focused on simple inter-
pretations of a complex reality.
The frequency of the search terms also highlights
what major issues were not mentioned. Drug production
costs, developing country pressure, and procurement
practices were hardly discussed but later identified by
civil society as being fundamentally problematic within
the regime[3]. Framing theory states that the emphasis
some aspects of a problem naturally occurs at the
expense of others[11]. Due to the focus on other issues
such as drug quality, aid, industry profits and market
competition, among others, little room was left to dis-
cuss these other implementation aspects of the regime.
Furthermore, the structure of the media policy debates
left almost no space for the nature of Canada’s human
rights obligations to be examined. Early in the legislative
process, the Liberal Government framed CAMR as a
tool to promote human rights but this appears to have
been empty rhetoric. The lack of discussion of human
rights indicates a missed opportunity by all stakeholders
to engage the public in a debate over how a country like
Canada can make policy to realize these obligations in
relation to drug access. It is possible that there was little
institutional receptivity to human rights as a policy goal;
however, introducing this aspect may have changed the
nature and content of the policy debates.
The dominant voice across most categories which we
examined was civil society. Their heavy use of the
media, especially prior to the Canadian government’s
decision to introduce legislation, likely played an impor-
tant agenda-setting role. Stephen Lewis amplified his
call to the Canadian government to implement the
WTO Decision through front page headlines, raising the
public’s hopes that Canada could play a leading role in
the fight against AIDS. In contrast, civil society’si n f l u -
ence on the policy contents may not have been as signif-
icant during the drafting of the legislation. The
government addressed civil society’sm a i nc o m p l a i n t ,
the Right of Refusal, but CAMR retained several clauses
that civil society, and the generic industry, claimed
made the regime unworkable. Civil society’su s eo ft h e
media appears to have been skillful but it is possible
that larger institutional, interest-based and political fac-
tors may have been at play which led to the outcome
we see today. These factors are the subject of further
research.
The lack of the brand industry’s presence in the media
is by no means an indicator of their interest in the legis-
lation. Scope of conflict theory suggests that it is in the
interests of the powerful to keep the conflict narrow in
a policy debate[13]. It is possible that the brand industry
did not have to rely on the news media to have its views
incorporated into the legislative process.
Two interest groups that were notably less present or
virtually absent from the media were generic companies
and representatives from developing countries. The
absence of the developing country voice is likely largely
due to the limitation of our study to national newspa-
pers, implying the heavy reliance on national sources of
information. The generic industry’s absence can be
partly attributed to the fact that civil society held similar
policy positions and already had a large presence in the
media. More importantly, given the lack of potential
profits from the legislation, their absence may have been
a reflection of the generic industry’s interest in seeing
the legislation pass.
There are some limitations to our study. First, our
qualitative analysis used a unique coding scheme, which
limits the generalizability of our results. By providing
the context for our analysis, readers will be able to
apply the lessons learned from this case to other litera-
ture. Second, our analysis of actors’ voices were not
quantified, however in making our judgments, frequency
was taken into account. Finally, the absence of analysis
for episodic and thematic articles prevents us from mak-
ing explicit inferences regarding the substantive nature
of the debates, however our discussion was informed
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our data pool.
Conclusions
This study illustrated how framing can restrict the pol-
icy debate, which has implications on the range of issues
and policy alternatives considered. The lack of discus-
sion of issues such as human rights obligations, pharma-
ceutical innovation and domestic economic issues
suggests that some of the major underlying policy goals
at stake in this case were not considered. Furthermore,
the debate failed to highlight issues which are now pos-
ing to be significant barriers to the use of the legislation,
namely drug production costs, procurement practices
and pressure faced by developing countries in using
similar patent law flexibilities. Using the media to
engage the public in more in-depth exploration of the
policy issues at stake may contribute to a more
informed policy development process.
Civil society’s use of the media appears to have been
successful in adding pressure to the government to
introduce the legislation, to remove the restrictive ‘right
of refusal’ clause, and to initiate the legislative review
during CAMR’s implementation. In this sense, the
media can be a venue in which those who do not have a
strong voice in policy debates can leverage their posi-
tion; however, the political and institutional context
must be taken into account as it may outweigh media
framing effects.
From this case, it appears that the media was a useful
and effective channel for civil society to raise public
attention to particular issues; however, its usefulness
appears to be limited. Mass media is a relatively blunt
instrument because framing effects can freeze the debate
into particular perspectives, while limiting the nuanced
debate needed for detailed, technical issues, which is
where the problems with CAMR lie. CAMR was a hailed
as a breakthrough concept by all stakeholders but pro-
b l e m sa r o s ed u r i n gi t si m p l e mentation, and ultimately,
the administrative and logistical requirements impeded
the initiative. Parties with weaker influence may face lim-
ited benefit from the public pressure raised by media but
the legislative process remains an important and effective
forum to flesh out policy implementation details.
Additional File 1: Summary of Policy Goals by Stakeholder Group.
A brief summary of the results grouped by policy goal and stakeholder is
provided in table format.
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1472-698X-10-1-
S1.DOC]
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